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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

Priority 13

v.
JOSE FRANCISCO ARROYO,
Case No. 890128
Defendant/Petitioner.
BRIEF OF THE DEFENDANT/PETITIONER
OPINION BELOW
The opinion of the Court of Appeals in State v. Arroyo,
No. 880062-CA (filed February 15, 1989) is attached as
Appendix A to this petition.

A copy of that Courtfs order

denying Respondent's Petition for Rehearing is attached
hereto as Appendix B.
JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals filed its opinion on February
15, 1989 (Appendix A).

The Court denied Mr. Arroyo's Peti-

tion for Rehearing on March 22, 1989 (Appendix B).

A

Petition for Writ of Certiorari was timely filed with this
Court pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme
Court.

A Writ of Certiorari was granted May 15, 1989.

1

This

Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann, Section
78-2-2(5) (1986).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A, Summary of Proceedings Below.
Petitioner, Jose Francisco Arroyo, was arrested and
charged with Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance
with Intent to Distribute for Value in violation of Utah
Code Annotated Section 58-37-8(1)(a)(i) (1953 as amended).
After a preliminary hearing, the Petitioner was bound over
to the District Court on the narcotics charge.

Arroyo moved

to suppress the evidence asserting that his stop by a highway patrol trooper for the traffic violation of "Following
Too Closely11 was a pretext stop.

The trial court granted

the Motion to Suppress and entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and an Order Suppressing the evidence on
January 6, 1989.

A copy of the Findings of Fact, Con-

clusions of Law and Order are attached hereto as Appendix C.
The State of Utah appealed the trial court's suppression
order.
On direct appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed
the trial court's order suppressing the evidence.
held that:
1. The trial judge's determination that
the stop of Arroyo's vehicle was an un2

The court

constitutional pretext to search for
drugs was a correct determination because a reasonable officer would not
have stopped Arroyo for "Following Too
Closely" except for some unarticulated
suspicion of more serious criminal activity;
2. Arroyo, through his counsel, stipulated that he had consented to the
search of his vehicle and based upon
misleading conduct by Arroyo's counsel,
said stipulation also included that the
consent was given voluntarily;
3. Although the original illegal stop
was unconstitutional, Arroyo's subsequent voluntary consent purged the taint
from the initial illegality, and the
Motion to Suppress was therefore improperly granted,
Mr. Arroyo petitioned for rehearing.

The Petition was

denied without comment and without addressing that the Court
of Appeals' decision had been based upon the erroneous conclusion that Arroyo's counsel had mislead the trial Court
and the State by stipulating that Arroyo had consented to
the search of his vehicle.

This Court granted a Writ of

Certiorari.
B. Pertinent Facts.
At approximately 4:00 p.m. on September 15, 1987, Utah
Highway Patrol Trooper, Paul Mangelson, was driving home
after completing his shift an hour earlier.

3

Trooper

Mangelson was driving southbound on 1-15 near Nephi, Utah,
when he observed a northbound truck-camper allegedly following the car in front of it too closely.

Trooper Mangelson

executed a U-turn through the median and caught up with
Arroyof s truck.
Trooper Mangelson claimed that the truck was following
the vehicle in front of him at a distance of three to eight
car lengths at a speed of approximately 50 mph.

Trooper

Mangelson pulled along side the truck in order to observe
its occupants and estimate the truck's speed.

Trooper

Mangelson noted that Arroyo and his passenger were hispanic,
and that the vehicle had out of state license plates.
Arroyo, the driver, was cited for "Following Too
Closely" and for Driving on an Expired Driver's License.
Trooper Mangelson then requested permission to search the
truck, and Arroyo agreed.
The search revealed approximately one kilogram of cocaine inside the passenger door panel.

Trooper Mangelson

then arrested Arroyo for possession of a control substance
with intent to distribute in violation of Utah Code
Annotated Section 58-37-8(1)(a)(i) (1986), second degree
felony.
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the

facts when it concluded that Petitioner's counsel had entered into such a stipulation.

There was no stipulation.

At the suppression hearing, the State's counsel
endeavored to probe the question of whether Arroyo's "consent" was voluntary.

Arroyo's counsel objected on the basis

that the only relevant issue was whether the original stop
was a pretext.
in error.

If Sierra is controlling, then counsel was

The trial court agreed with Petitioner's counsel

and sustained the objection.

However, Arroyo's counsel did

not at that time stipulate that Arroyo had consented to the
search of the vehicle.

The only representation made in that

regard was* made by the State's counsel, and not Arroyo's
counsel.

The colloquy was as follows:

Trooper Mangelson: I approached the vehicle.
asked for a driver's license. I made as many
observations about the vehicle as I could.

I

Question (Don Eyre, Juab County Attorney): Describe what you observed. Answer: I observed . . .
Mr. Bugden: Your Honor, for the record, I think I
would object to any further inquiry at this point.
My motion only goes to the propriety and the lawfulness of the stop. And I think that is what . .
The Court:
Mr Eyre:

Was this a consent search?

Yes, sir.

The Court: I think that is true, counsel. It goes
strictly to the stop.
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'to

"voluntariness" based upon a stipulation which the record
demonstrates never happened.
To large extent, the result reached by the Court of
Appeals occurred because of a blurring or imprecise use of
the word "consent".

Fourth Amendment analysis of consent

requires reaching a conclusion of consent on at least three
different levels.

The Court of Appeals lost sight of this

important distinction.
In the first instance, a finding of consent must be
made in the sense that law enforcement requests permission
to search, and consent or acquiescence is given (Officer:
Mr. Defendant, may I search your truck?
you may; I guess I have no choice).

Defendant:

Yes,

When that happens, it

can fairly be said that consent has been given.
On the next level, a finding must be made whether that
consent was given voluntarily.

Coercion, explicit or im-

plied, would negate a finding of voluntary consent.

Some of

the factors a court might consider when deciding the voluntariness question of fact include the defendant's age,
intelligence, whether the defendant was in custody, the
nature of the police questioning, the environment in which
it took place, and the defendant's knowledge of his right to
withhold consent.
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i mention with the consent Issue.

The trial court found nothing more in Finding of Fact 18
than that Trooper Mangelson requested permission to search
Arroyo's truck and Arroyo agreed or consented.

The record

contains no findings to support a conclusion of law of
voluntary consent.
Ct. App. 1988).

See State v. Sierra, 754. P.2d 972 (Utah

The trial court entered no conclusions of

law concerning either consent or the voluntariness of that
consent.
Under these circumstances, a remand is certainly appropriate to consider the consent issue.

Contrary to the

Court of Appeals' conclusion, Petitioner's counsel did not
enter into any stipulation, and accordingly, he did not
mislead the State and the Court.

Petitioner's counsel

interposed an objection when the State sought to develop the
consent issue.

If Sierra is controlling on this point, then

counsel was wrong in so doing.

He erred.

However, no

mischievous intent or design was contemplated.

By object-

ing, counsel did nothing more than any lawyer does when he
erroneously objects and the trial judge erroneously sustains
the objection.

Under these circumstances, if the "but for"

test is rejected and Sierra is controlling, then a remand
for a hearing consistent with State v. Sierra, supra, is
certainly warranted.
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IHh ula:: CU6h L" OF APPEALS DECIDED BOTH THE
CONSENT "ISSUE AND THE VOLUNTARINESS OF THE CONSENTISSUE CONTRARY TO ITS DECISION IN STATE V. SIERRA/ 754
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,- given. *;: .mper v_. State, 391 U.S.
543
383.Ct. "T783, T^91~ ^ L.Fd.2d
~~~ ; 1 j*^jo ; . The record below .».-j:ely
:;:a^es that, according to Tfficei
• , "iierra offered to let him search
the trunk of the car. Tte record contains no facts indicating Sierra consented ' Officer Smith's search of the
interior of the car, where be discovered
the incriminating evidence, "or does
the record reveal exactly how Offic r
Smith went from searching the trunk i
the car to searching the passenger side
of the interior; how Officer Smith rame
to searching underneath the car and
looking at the gas tank; how Officer
Smith retrieved the keys to tue car to
verify the gas level reading; noi how
Sierra responded, if at all, ro Officer
Smith* s conduct. A translate:- was re11

quired for Sierra at the hearing on the
motion to suppress, which supports his
claim that he had difficulty communicating with Officer Smith. The district
court did not find that SierraTs consent
was voluntary nor did it find that the
evidence procured was not obtained by
the officers' "exploitation of [the primary illegality]" and "sufficiently distinguishable" from the initial illegal
stop.
(Emphasis supplied, Id. at 981).
In the instant matter these same deficiencies in the
record exist.

Because ArroyoTs counsel and the trial court

applied a "but for" test, no facts were presented in connection with the consent issues.

The consent and the attenua-

tion issues are separate and distinct:

By definition, then, Fourth Amendment
"voluntarines" necessarily requires a
finding by the district court that the
evidence was obtained freely and not by
police "exploitation of [the primary]
illegality . . . Wong Sun, supra 371
U.S. at 487-88, 83 S.Ct. at 417, making
the two findings mutually exclusive.
United States v. Carson, 793 F.2d 1141,
1150 (10th Cir. 1986). (Emphasis supplied) •

The omission in this regard does not justify a reversal.
Instead, just as in Sierra, this case should be remanded to
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subsequently obtained in the search of the vehicle.

The

Court of Appeals incorrectly assumed that such a Finding of
Fact and Conclusion of Law had been made by the trial court
when none in fact had been made.

Finding of Fact 18 does

not support a conclusion of law on the voluntariness of the
consent.
The Court of Appeals' assumption that a voluntary consent necessarily vitiates or attenuates the taint of a prior
illegal stop is contrary to the decisional law which has
developed on this point.

Indeed, the Arroyo decision con-

tradicts the Court of Appeals own decision to remand in
Sierra.
In reaching this result, the Court of Appeals relied on
United States v. Carson, 793 F.2d 1141 (10th Cir. 1986).
Petitioner submits that the Court of Appeals interpretation
of Carson is overbroad when viewed in context with other
rulings from the Tenth Circuit.
To understand the Court of Appeals1 misapplication of
Carson, a review of the facts is necessary.
a dove hunting violation.

Carson involved

A deputy sheriff observed the

defendant hunting, and noticed a large pail belonging to the
defendant.

The pail contained dead doves.

The sheriff then

left the area and contacted a state game protection officer.
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In the context of a claimed voluntary consent to
search, the Tenth Circuit court held that the "exploitation
of the primary illegality" meant that the law enforcement
agents used the fruits of the primary illegality to coerce
the defendant into granting his consent.

The court noted

that normally the issue would be resolved by determining if
the grant of consent was voluntary.

However, the manner of

the request to search may also render the consent involuntary.

The court described the critical facts that supported

its conclusion.

First, the defendant had no idea his pail

had even been searched the first time and accordingly, he
was totally unaware that the prior illegal search had even
taken place.

Second, there was no use of the illegal first

search to coerce the consent.

Those facts are distinguish-

able from the facts in the case at bar.
Moreover, notwithstanding a finding of voluntary consent, courts have frequently held that the State has not
carried its burden to purge the primary illegality of the
Wong Sun taint.

In Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1982), a

suspect's consent to search his two suitcases was tainted by
his illegal detention and was ineffective to justify the
search of his two suitcases.

Royer was approached at an

airport by detectives who asked for his airline ticket and
16

driver's license.

Without returning the ticket and license

the detectives asked Royer to accompany them to a small
room.

After obtaining Royer's luggage from the airline

without his consent, he then produced a key and unlocked one
suitcase.

Drugs were found in that suitcase.

Royer then

indicated to the detectives that he did not know the
bination to the lock of the second suitcase.

com-

When asked if

he objected to the detective opening the suitcase, Royer
said, "no, go ahead," and did not object when the detective
further
open.

explained the suitcase might have to be pried
The trial court concluded that RoyerTs

the search was "freely and voluntarily given".

consent to
The Florida

District Court of Appeal held, inter alia, that "at the time
his consent to search was obtained, he was unlawfully confined
and consent to search was therefore invalid because tainted
by the unlawful confinement." 460 U.S. at 495.

The Florida

Court of Appeals held that because there was no proof in a
"break in a chain of illegality" the consent was invalid as
a matter of law.

In affirming the suppression order, the

United States Supreme Court stated:
Because we affirm the Florida District Court of
Appeals' conclusion that Royer was being illegally
detained when he consented to the search of his
17

luggage, we agree that the consent was tainted by
the illegality . . .
Id at 507.
The Petitioner submits that the same reasoning applies
in the instant matter.

Once the conclusion is reached that

the Petitioner was unlawfully stopped, and therefore unlawfully detained by Trooper Mangelson, then the State in the
instant matter has the same burden that the State in Florida
v. Royer was unable to sustain.
In United States v. Taheri, 648 F.2d 598 (9th Cir.
1981), an informant contacted the DEA and provided information that a person was selling heroin from a particular
motel room.

The informant furnished the DEA with a descrip-

tion of the individual.

The DEA contacted the motel clerk

and confirmed that the defendant matched the description
provided by the informant.

The clerk advised the DEA that

the defendant was expecting a package.

When the package

arrived, the motel clerk contacted the DEA.

The package had

been damaged, and when the DEA agent was handling the package, it broke open and a bindle fell out.
positive for heroin.
on the package.

Additionally,

The bindle tested

a trained dog altered

A search warrant was then obtained and most

of the contents of the package were seized.
18

However, the

defendant was permitted to pick up the package with some of
its contents still intact.

As soon as the defendant took

possession of the package he was arrested.

Permission was

then requested to search his vehicle and a room in a different motel. The defendant executed written consent forms.
Opium was found in both locations.

On appeal, the issue

presented was whether the defendant's post-arrest consent
was a sufficiently independent act to avoid the exclusion of
the opium.

The Ninth Circuit concluded that even assuming

the consent was voluntary, "the evidence must nonetheless be
suppressed if the unconstitutional conduct was not sufficiently attenuated from the subsequent seizure to avoid
exclusion of the evidence . . . "

The Petitioner submits

that the same should hold true in the instant matter.

Even

assuming a voluntary consent, the government must still
establish that the consent sufficiently attenuated the taint
from the prior unlawful pretext stop.

In Taheri the

government was unable to carry its burden:
The government, which bears the burden of showing
admissibility in these circumstances . . . points
to no intervening events or lapse of time which
would show Taheri ? s consent was sufficiently an
act of free will to purge the primary taint of the
unlawful invasion.
Id at 601.

19

For that reason, the Ninth Circuit held that the opium was
inadmissible.
Similarly in United States v. Gooding, 695 F.2d 78 (4th
Cir. 1982), the Court stated, "we hold, as a matter of law
on the undisputed facts of the record, that Goodingfs illegal seizure tainted all that ensued in the investigative
encounter, and that his consent to the initial search, even
if voluntary, did not vitiate the taint."
Gooding court suppressed the evidence.

Id at 84.

The

The Court held as

follows:
The connection between the illegal seizure and the
consent—all occurring within the same brief,
continuous encounter--was not sufficiently attenuated to remove the former's taint from the
ultimate fruits of a search.
Id at 84.
In United States v. Recalde, 761 F.2d 1448 (10th Cir.
1985), the Court focused upon the question of whether the
consent to search was valid despite the unlawful seizure and
detention of the Defendant.

In Recalde, the District Court

held that the consent was knowing and voluntary.

In the

instant matter, there was no such finding.
By focusing only on the voluntariness of the Defendant's consent and by not considering whether he had been
unlawfully seized, the Recalde court concluded that the
20

District Court had misapplied the Supreme Court decisions
governing the issues.

Id at 1457.

"The Court therefore did

not make its finding in light of the requirement that such
consent be free from the taint of the illegal detention.
Because of this, and because of the illegal nature of
RecaldeTs seizure and detention are critical, we conclude
that the District Court's finding of consent is
erroneous."

Id at 1458.

clearly

Thus, notwithstanding that Recalde

executed a written consent form, the Court, held that the
consent was tainted by his prior illegal arrest and detention. The Petitioner submits that the same conclusion will
be borne out by the evidence in the instant matter.
In United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512 (10th Cir.
1988), the Tenth Circuit found that the stop of the vehicle
for a seat belt violation was a pretext for an investigation. The District Court had failed to make any findings
with respect to the issue of the consent to search.

The

case was remanded to the District Court so that the proper
findings could be made.

The Court ordered that findings on

the issue of consent be made applying the factors discussed
in Recalde, supra.

In doing so, the Court noted that there

would be few cases involving an illegal detention where a

21

subsequent search could be made legitimate by a voluntary
consent.
POINT IV:
ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION CONFERS GREATER PROTECTION THAN THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION SECURED BY THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION.
In State v. Nielson, 727 P.2d 188 (Ut. 1986), and State
v. Rice, 717 P.2d 695 (Ut, 1986), a majority of the Supreme
Court of Utah took the position that Article I, Section 14
of the Constitution of Utah may be interpreted to provide
broader protection than the Fourth Amendment.

Since both

provisions share nearly identical language this would not be
the result of any textual, differences between the two provisions.

The result obtains because a state court may inter-

pret its own constitution independent of the federal decisions, and such decisions are not subject to federal review
or reversal.

Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).

Also

see, State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803 (Utah 1986); State v. Hygh,
711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985); State v. Larocco, 742 P.2d 89
(Utah 1987).
A state constitutional interpretation of

Wong Sun

poisoned fruits could greatly simplify the law on this
issue.

If a "but for" test was applied, then law enforce-

ment officers would not be permitted to profit from prior
22

illegal conduct.

In contrast, allowing law enforcement to

attenuate the taint by relying upon some intervening event,
such as consent, police are essentially rewarded for violating Fourth Amendments rights•

That is to say, by permitting

officers to legitimate illegal stops by obtaining consent,
an officer's illegal actions are judicially condoned.
However, under Utah constitutional precepts, any prior
illegality could be held to vitiate or taint any consent
which flowed from the prior unlawful conduct.
Moreover, under a purely state analysis, this Court
could require that officers inform defendants that they have
the right to refuse to permit a search.

Likewise, if a

defendant is truly free to leave an encounter with a police
officer, then this Court could require that defendants be so
informed before a voluntary consent may be established by
the prosecution.
Such holdings based solely on the Utah Constitution
would alleviate a number of confusing areas related to the
law of search and seizure.

Law enforcement officers would

then only need to follow the stricter state requirements.
Federal search and seizure, with its many cumbersome and
many times esoteric exceptions, would be irrelevant to the

23

officer on the street.

Such simplicity would make the

application of search and seizure law easier,
CONCLUSION
Applying a state constitutional analysis, Mr, Arroyo
respectfully requests that the trial courtTs ruling suppressing the evidence be affirmed.

In the alternative, Mr.

Arroyo respectfully requests the matter be remanded to the
trial court for a Sierra hearing on the consent and attenuation issues.

^

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / ^ ° day of June, 1989.

WALTER F. BUGDEN/ JJ
Attorney for RespWide^
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed four (4) true and cor
rect copies of the foregoing Brief of Petitioner, this
day of June, 1989 to:
Paul Van Dam
Attorney General
Sandra Sjogren
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
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this

Starter • . Arroyo
for dismissal oa • this
That motion wit denied by the Utah
Court bficm the CMC WM tnntffTTod to
Wt are not mematd to disturb the

cooa*co

Walter P. Bugden, Jr., Salt Like Otyf for
JLespoodent
Before Judges Davidson, BQfinfs. and Gtrff.

I G w l ' l mlpOMtiOQ Of this 1006; g a d reject

Marveon s jiinscxxjonai cnajscngg. see vjooott t.
OPINION
AJL. WUliMmt * A0OO, 739 PJ2d 634, 636 (Utah
Ct.App.19f7).
BILLINGS. Judge:
X On the contrary, the 'strict construction* rait
The State of Utah filed an htteriocutory appeal
that if employed in connection with ineuranoe poo* cha fir ngjng the district court's aippressioo of
des eooonspneoM just the opposite result* Any cocaine acted after a Utah Highway trooper
ambiguity concernint the scope of Insurance is stopped lose Pi am lair). Arroyo ('Arroyo*) for an
awaurued in favor of en wage. See, e^« Puflar r, alleged traffic violation. The trial court found the
XXrector of Pittance, 694 PJ&d 1045. 1047 (Utah jtop of Arroyo's vehicle was a pretext stop which
1915) ('An insured is entitled to the broadest prot- violated Arroyo*! fourth amendment rights. We
ection be could have reasonably understood to be
provided by the policy."); W&Bams v. first Cottony
life Ins. Co.. 393 PJd 334, 336 (Utah 1979)
FACTS
(ambiguity in insurance contract zsust be ooawtrued
At apptojdmatery 4:00 pjn. on September 13,
in favor of insured); XXeees v. Safeco U£* Ins. Cou. 19f7, Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Paul Mang21 Utah 2d 147. 442 PJ2d 4 0 . 471 <196f) (no
ambiguous n element may be enforced *igi''t*^ an cboa (Trooper Mangdson*) was driving home
insured). See a t e CoJard r. American PmaOy Mat. after completing his shift an hour earner. Trooper
In*. Co., 709 PJd 11. 14 (Colo. App. 1913) Of en Mingffsoa was driving south bound on 1*13 near
insurance company Intends to exclude from coverage Nephi, Utah, when he observed a northbound
damage resulting from the insured t own negligence, truck-camper following the car in front of. it too
it must do so clearly and unambiguously); American closer/. Trooper. Maagelsott .made a U-turn
Ernst ins. Co. v. MCM Grand Hottis. Xncw 729 through the median and caught up with Arroyo's
PJM 1332. 1334 (Nev. 1986) (Insurance contracts are tiuck«
construed to accompBsh the object of providing
Trooper Mangdson observed that the truck was
indemnity to the insured); Weidoo r. Commerdtd following the venide in front of him at a distance
Uaiotx Aasuraace Co*. 103 NJ4. 322. 710 PJEd » . of three to eight.car lengths at a speed of appro*
91 (19t5) ("When an ambiguity exists, the court Timet fry fifty; miks per hour. Trooper Mart gri son
must const! ue the policy so as to sustain indem- polled alnwgrirht the truck in order to observe its
nity.").
> >•. occupants and estimate the truck's tpctd.
4. Under different facts, the lack of expttdt kn*»~ Trooper Maaaebon noted that Arroyo and. his
uage cicaily indicating an Intra! to provide coverage peawnaer . were. Hispanic, and he stopped the
for the insured's own negligence may leave open the truck..,•, ***„i.,..\.nucsooa ot wnetner sucn coverage WM tntenoeo.
Arroyo, the driver, was dted for • following- too
-However, sucn amnignity WQUIQ oe rcsorveo rnrougn
the ordinary ruies of contract interpretation rather . closely* and for driving on. an expired driver's
by invoking the stria, construction rule. See Boense. Trooper- MtngHtnn then asked Arroyo if
WUbum•>. Iauntmm Ekccric. 74t.ff.2d he could search mstiuck. and Arroyo agreed.
.The' search, .reveaied approximately one kilo3S2.3S3-S6 (Utah CX App. 196S).
gram of cocaine inside tbc'peseeager door paneii.
Trooper Msrtgflson then arrested Arroyo for
poeaeaskxi of a con trowed mbs/sime with, intent to
distribute m violation of Utah Code Amu §5*374(lXiffl (19<6>. a second degree felony.
^ ^
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- Arroyo moved to suppress the cocaine daiming
Trooper Meageisoo's traffic stop was a pretext to
IN THE
search his truck for evidence of a more serious
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
crime.. The trial court found no traffic violation
had occurred and ruled that Trooper Mangeison's
STATE of Utah,
stop of Arroyo's truck was a pretext to Investii Appeamatt)
gate-a vehicle ac found wipidous because of out•.
of-state., license plates and Hispanic omipantt,
loot Francisco A&ROYO,
The trial court found Arroyo consented to the
Dcfeadaataad
sueeeouent search of his tnw'k, but nevertheless.
granted •', the \ motion to suppress. The. State
NewSSMCUCA
FILED: February 15.19*9
The issues, on appeal are (1) whether the trial
court cried . in ruling that Trooper Mangdson'i
stop of Arroyo for 'following too dosery' was a
Fourth District,'Juab County
pretext stop, and (2) whether Arroyo'r subseqHonorable Ray M. Harding .
uent consent ux the search of his truck purged the
ATTORNEYS:
' • >•?
,iamsOCtneoineAwu)eunconsunn^
David L. Wilkinson aad Sondra L* Sjogren,
. The trial court's factual evaluation underlying
s- Salt Lake City, for AppeUaat
its decision tn> grant or deny a motion to suppress
wul not be disturbed unless it is dearry erroneous.
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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a Dut for* exclusionary rule for evidence seized
as a result of prior flkgaiiry.' IdL (citations
omitted). Thus, even though this evidence would
not have been dacovered *but for* the prior
illegal stop* the evidence, is not per at Inadmissible. JdL Moreover, a search conducted pursuant
to vo/untarr consent purges the taint from the
prior illegality. Sen*, 754 ?Jd at 980 (citing Wong
PRETEXT STOP
Sua v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 4S7We first consider whether Trooper Mangdtoo's 81 (1963)). Accord United States v. Carson, 793
stop of Arroyo's truck was incident to a lawful F^d 1141. 1148-49 (10th Or. 1986), cert.
stop for a traffic violation or was a constitution- denied, 107 S.O. 315 (1986); State v. Aqwhr.
ally defective 'pretext* stop. A ponce officer may 758 PJd. 457, 459 (Utah 0 . App. 1988). To
stop a vehide for a traffic violation committed in determine whether consent is voluntary, we look
the officer's presence. Nevertheless, a police to the totality of the circumstances to see if the
officer may not 'use a misdemeanor arrest as a consent was in fact voluntarily given and not the
pretext to search for evidence of a more serious result of **duress or coercion, express or
crime/ Sierra, 754 PJd at 977. Courts must look implied." Sierra, 754 P.2d at 980 (quoting Sento the totality of the circumstances to determine I necxioth v. fliisramonfr, 412 VS. 218, 219
whether a stop for a traffic violation and subse- (1973)). The State bears the burden of proving
quent arrest is a pretext. This involves 'an obje- | that consent was voluntarily given. Sierra, 754
ctive, assessment of the officer's actions in light of PJdat981.
ffif facts w\ <"4wi»fnff^»r»* cotxfrouting hv*\ at I
In this regard, we note Arroyo did not contest
the time.* Id. The actual state of mind of the the State's argument at the suppression hearing
officer at the time of the chaiknged action is irr- that he voluntarily consented to the search of his
elevant, id. (quoting MjuyiMnd v. Macon, 472 duck. Arroyo, through his counsel tripulamd that
U.S. 463 (1985)). Thus, in this appeal, the ques- he consented to the starch. Arroyo's counsel
tion is whether a reasonable officer. In view of objected when the State attempted to offer evidthe totality of the cuxumstanccs of this case, ence to establish Arroyo's consent was voluntary,
would have stopped Arroyo for 'following too daimhtg it was not relevant as the only issue was
doscry.* The proper focus is not on whether whether the original stop was a pretext. As a
Trooper Mangrison could have validly made the result, the trial court limited tnttmony concerning
stop. Sferra, 754PJdat978.
. . I the cuxumsfanfTS surrounding Arroyo s consent.
Trooper Mangirhon observed Arroyo following The trial judge specifically found that Arroyo
the vehide in front of him at a distance of I consented to the search of his truck, and there is
between three and eight car lengths at a speed of I f^^k'it H tkf fTT^ tf% ow*r^** r ****** fi«w4i<*«>
approximately fifty miles per hour. It is notewo- I For. the first ome on appeal, couneH now
rthy that Trooper MsngHson had enm plrtrri his argues that Arroyo's consent was not voluntary
shift an hour earner, and was driving home in the as there was no *break in the causal connection
opposite direction from Arroyo when he observed between the Sega&ty and the evidence thereby
the alleged traffic violation, one for which very obtained.* United States v. Jtocaide, 761 ¥J2d
few citations are issued.3 Trooper Mangdsoo did 1448, 1458 (10th Or. 1985). However, this argunot stop Arroyo until he had pulled alongside the ment should have been made below. A defendant
track, and observed that the occupants were cannot mislead the State and the court by stipulHispanic, having already noted that Arroyo was ating that consent was given, thus preventing the
driving a truck with out-of-state license plates.
State from exploring the circumsatnees of the
We agree with the trial judge that the stop was consent, and then argue for the first time on'
an uncoostitudonal pretext.to search for drugs. appeal that the consent given was not voluntary.
We are persuaded that a reasonable officer would I Bit^d on these nrrttiTt********* we conclude that
not have stopped Arroyo and cited him for defendant's stipulation induded that the consent
'following too closely* except for some unartic- was given voluntarily.
uuued suspidoo of more serious criminal activity.
Thus, sithrmgh the original illegal stop was
L uncon*titutional, Arroyo's subsequent voluntary
CONSENT
Our inquiry does not end with the determination I consent purged the taint from the initial illegality,
that Trooper Mangdson's stop of Arroyo, was and the motion to suppress should not have been
unconnitntional. We must next consider whether I granted.
Accordingly, the order granting Arroyo's
Arroyo's subsequent consent to the search of his
truck purged the taint of the Hkgsl stop thereby motion to suppress the evidence is reversed, and
making admissible the cocaine seixed. The appr- I the case is remanded for trial,
opriate Inquiry is "whether, granting establishJudith M. Bulings, Judge
ment of the primary illegality, the evidence to WE CONCUR;
which instant objection is made has been come at
Regnal W. Garff, Judge
by exploitation of that illegality or instead by
Richard C Davidson, Judge
means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of
the primary taint." Sierra, 754 P.2d u 930
(quoting Wong Sun v. United StMtes, 371 VS. 1. Our analysis is confined to the protections
471,4S7-M (1963)).
I granted under the Fourth Amendment to the United
„ _

^ i

WWIMHIJ. MMIG v.

ajena, |!

754 ?3d 972, 974 (Utah <X App. 19SSJ.
However, is reviewing the trial court's legal
coochitiona baaed upon those finding!, we afford
no deference and apply a correction of error standard.. Gates v. Q i r t z , 749 P.2d 658, 659 (Utah
1988),
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m Uufa A4v, to, H

S u m Constitution rtther than article 1, section 14
of the Utah Constitution. Arroyo attempts to raise
the nate constlttrtiooal issue aa has beta encouraged
by oar Supreme Court. See, *L#., 1) Stale r. La/Terry; 749 P-2d 1239, 1247 n. 3 (Utah 19M); 2) Scan?
v. JSarf. 716 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1986). However, a
three line oonduaory statement as to the greater
scope of state constitutional protections is an insuffient briefing for us to embark on a state constitutional analysts and we, therefore, refuse to do so.
When analyzing state constitutional issues, our
Supreme Court has cited with approval the approach taken in State v. Jewerx, 146 Vt. 221, 500 AJtf
233(19*5).
2. Toooper Mangelson testified that he had issued
only three or four citations for "following too
dosery" in 1987.
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IN T H E
U T A H C O U R T O F APPEAJLS
WeadeJ! E. Taylor,
. Plaintiff mad Appellant,
v.
The ESTATE OF GRANT TAYLOR,
skee atari, Esther Tayior, Darren G. Taylor*
mad Jofca Does 1 through 5,
Defeadaats and Respondeat*.
No. SS0136-CA
FIT JED: Febraary 15, 19tf
Third District, Salt Lake County
Honorable Raymond S. Uno
ATTORNEYS:
A. Howard Lundgren, Salt Lake City, for
Appellant
Ldand S. McCullough, P. Bryan Fishbura,
Salt Lake City, for Respondents
.Before Judges Rilling*, Jackson and Onne,
OPINION
ORME, Judge:
Wendell Taylor appeals the trial court*! entry
of summary judgment against him. Wendell
argues that 1) summary judgment was inappropriate due to unresolved issues of material fact
regarding the validity of his deceased brother's
alleged will; 2) a document favorable to him
should be given effect as his brother's will, even
though it does not strictly comply with the Utah
Probate Code; and 3) the trial court erred in
ordering Wendell to pay a portion of defendants'
attorney fees. We affirm in large part, but
remand for reassessment of one aspect of the
court's judgment.

FACTS
In January 1984, Grant Tayior loaned a sum of
money to his brother, plaintiff Wendell Tayior.
At the time of the loan, Grant had been divorced
for about one month from Ins wife of more than
forty years, defendant Esther Tayior. On June 30,
1984, Grant' dictated a document to a second
brother, Noel Taylor, providing that the loan to
Wendell he forgiven upon Grant's death. Nod
typed this document and Grant ttgocd it in the
presence of Nod and Nod's wife, Geraldine.
Nod then signed the document as a witness and
filed it away. Geraldine did not sign the aVxrrment
at that time.
Shortly after executing the June 30 document,
Grant, who had been ill with cancer, worsened
considerably. On August 30, 1984, he excepted a
document entitled 'Last Will and Testament.* In
this docrtment, Grant made no provision for his
former wife, Esther, nor did he mention the debt
owed by Wendell or the June 30 document forgiving the debt. The wul recited that the bulk of
Grant's estate go to a trust, created the same
date, in favor of his children.
Grant and Esther remarried on September 21,
19$4, approximately ten months after their
divorce. The trust Grant established on August 30
was immediately amended to include Esther as a
beneficiary. At the time of the remarriage,
Grant's cancer had rendered him unable to walk
or speak audibly and he died five days later.
Shortly thereafter, his estate was informally probated pursuant to the August 30 will.
Following Grant's death, efforts were made to
obtain repayment from Wendell of the money
Grant had loaned him* Unaware of the June 30
document forgiving the debt, Wendell cornpiiined
of these efforts to Nod, at which time Nod informed Wendell of that document. However, the
document was not located and delivered to
Wendell until carry 1985. In October of that year,
Wendell filed this action to invalidate the previously probated August 30 document and give
testamentary effect to the terms of the original
June 30 document forgiving repayment of the
loan made by Grant.
Wendell claimed that the June 30 document
was actually Grant's last valid will, the August 30
document being a product of dmcu or undue
ififh^v^ Wendell attached to his complaint a
copy of the June 30 document bearing only the
signatures of Grant and Nod. Based on the fact
that the purported will bore the signature of only
one witness, defendants' counsd filed a motion
to dismiss Wendell's complaint Two days before
defendants' motion to dismiss was to be argued,
Wendell filed an affidavit in which he claimed
that the dnotmmt attached to his complaint was
not aa accurate copy of the June 30 document.
Attached to his affidavit was another copy of the
document bearing the additions! witness signature
of Geraldine Tayior. Accordingly, defendants'
motion to dismiss was continued as it only addressed the validity of a document bearing one
witness signature.
Defendants' counsd promptly deposed Nod
and Geraldine Tayior. Geraldine testified that she
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UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS
^
State of Utah,

ORDER

Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.

No. 880062-CA

Jose Francisco Arroyo,
Defendant and Respondent.

This matter is before the Court upon a Petition for
Rehearing filed by the Respondent.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Respondent's Petition for
Rehearing is denied.
Dated this 22nd day of March, 1989.
FOR THE COURT:
/J

yj/tXic/ y^ri^i. -L

Mary T. Jloosian
Clerk<ToY-the Court
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WALTER F. BUGDEN, JR. #480
Attorney for Defendant
257 Towers, Suite 340
257 East 200 South - 10
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7282
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STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

:

v.

:

JOSE FRANCISCO ARROYO,

:

Defendant.

:
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Case No.

81-D

On December 7, 1987, the Defendant's Motion to Suppress
came on before this Court for an Evidentiary Hearing.

The

- ^e was represented by its attorney, Donald J. Eyre, Jr.,
. the Defendant was present in person, and represented by
his counsel, Walter F. Bugden, Jr.

Highway Patrol Trooper

Paul Mangelson and the Defendant Jose Francisco Arroyo both
testified at thic hearing.

After giving careful consideration

to the testimony presented at the hearing, the demeanor of the
witnesses on the witness stand, reviewing memoranda and case
law submitted to the Court by both counsel, and listening to
oral argument, this Court enters the following:
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FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On September 15, 1987, at approximately 4:00 p.m.

the Defendant, Jose Francisco Arroyo, was the driver of an
older model Ford Pick-up with a camper.

The vehicle was

headed in the northbound direction on 1-15 near Nephi, Utah.
2.

On the same date, and at the same time, Highway

Patrol Trooper Paul Mangelson was driving in a southbound
direction on 1-15 when he observed the truck driven by the
Defendant proceeding in a northbound direction.
3.

The Defendant testified he was driving in a group or

cluster of three cars, his vehicle being the third vehicle in
the group.

Trooper Mangelson testified that he only saw two

vehicles in the northbound direction and that the Defendant's
vehicle was the rear vehicle.
4.

y
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Trooper Mangelson observed that the Defendant's

vehicle had out of state (California) license plates.
5.

In July of 1987, Trooper Mangelson attended a

seminar which focused upon the types of individuals who
transport controlled substances and the types of vehicles that
said controlled substances are transported in.
6.

Trooper Mangelson testified that by in large the

Utah Highway Patrol had found that most drug trafficing was
done by Colombians, Cubans, and Hispanics.
7.

Trooper Mangelson also testified that one of the

topics discussed at the seminar was the necessity for having a
reason to stop an automobile driven by a Colombian, Cuban, or
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an Hispanic.

Trooper Mangelson understood that he could not

stop a vehicle just because the driver was of Latin origin,
8.

As a result Trooper Mangelson's training at this

seminar, he admitted that whenever he observed an Hispanic
individual driving a vehicle he wanted to stop the vehicle.
The Trooper also admitted that once he stopped an Hispanic
driver, 80% of the time he requested permission to search the
vehicle.
9.

Trooper . MapgeJLgpn estimated the Defendant's speed

was 50^ miles per hour.

As the Trooper's vehicle passed the

Defendant's vehicle heading in opposite directions, the
Trooper testified that he believed the Defendant's vehicle was
three to four, maybe five cars lengths behind the vehicle
immediately in front of it.

Based on the Trooper's estimate

of the Defendant's speed, the Trooper testified that he
concluded that the Defendant was "Following too Close" to the
vehicle immediately in front of it.
10.

The Trooper then executed a U-turn through the

median and caught up with the Defendant's vehicle within a
half mile to a mile from the location of the initial
observation of the Defendant's vehicle.
11.

Upon overtaking the Defendant's vehicle the Trooper

testified that rather than pulling the Defendant over
immediately, he instead pulled up along side the Defendant's
vehicle in order to observe the occupants of >he Defendant's
i l l i i i 1i
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Trooper Mangelson testified that the Defendant's

vehicle was still three to four, maybe five cars lengths
behind the vehicle directly in front of it, and that this
distance was unsafe, and therefore the Defendant was
"Following too Close" in violation of the applicable traffic
code.
13.

When the Trooper pulled along side the Defendant's

vehicle, the Trooper did observe that the two occupants of the
Defendant's vehicle were of Latin origin.
14.

Under cross-examination, the Trooper denied that it

was his normal procedure when issuing a citation to an
individual for "Following too Close" to record the license
plate of the front car.

However, the Trooper's denial on this-

point was contradicted by tape recorded testimony from the
Trooper at the preliminary hearing held in this matter.

The

Trooper admitted that he had not recorded the license plate
number of the front car in this case.
15.

The Defendant testified that he was at least 85 tc

95 feet or nine car lengths, behind the vehicle immediately in
front of his own.

The Court finds this testimony to be

credible.
16.

In contrast, the Court is unpersuaded that Trooper

Mangelson rightfully determined that the Defendant was
"Following too Close" or that any other attested facts
preponderated to the level necessary to permit a
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constitutional stop of the Defendant's vehicle.

Moreover, the

Court finds that the Trooper's own testimony established the
probability that no violation of law occurred, and that the
alleged violation was only a pretext asserted by the Trooper
to justify his stop of a vehicle with out of state license
plates and with occupants of Latin origin,
17.

The Trooper stopped" the Defendant's vehicle for

allegedly "Following too Close".

Upon stopping the

Defendant's vehicle, he asked for and received identification
from the Defendant.

However, upon receiving this

identification, and learning from the Defendant that he had
only recently acquired the automobile, the Trooper did not run
a NCIC check on either the driver or the Defendant's vehicle
(to verify if the vehicle was stolen).

The Trooper denied

that running a NCIC check was standard police procedure.
18.

The Trooper requested permission to search the

D e f e n d a n t s vehicle, and the Defendant consented to the search
of the vehicle.
19.

After searching the camper portion of the truck,

Trooper Mangelson detected that a package of some sort was
inside of the passengers's door.

After gaining access to the

inside panel of the passengers's door, Trooper Mangelson
removed three bundles containing approximately one kilogram of
a white powder wrapped in duct tape.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact of the Court now
enters the following:
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1*

A stop of an automobile can only be made upon

reasonable and articulable suspicion, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1 (1986) or upon probable cause, Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S.
1032 (1983).
2.

Trooper Mangelson lacked any reasonable, articulable

suspicion to stop the Defendant in the case at bar.

Instead,

the stop of the Defendant by Trooper Mangelson for allegedly
"Following too Close" was only a pretext utilized by the
Trooper to justify the stop of a vehicle with out of state
license plates and with occupants of Latin origin.

Pretext

stops are unconstitutional. State v. Mendoza, Slip opinion no.
20922 (Utah Dec- 1, 1987).
3.

The pretextural stop was employed by the Trooper to

conceal his genuine investigative purpose.

ESecause the stop

of the Defendant in the case at bar was unsupported by either
articulable suspicion or probable cause, the Defendant was
unlawfully detained in violation of the Fourth Amendment of
the United states Constitution and Article 1 Section 14 of the
Utah Constitution.
4.

An

evidence seized as a result of the Defendant's

unlawful detention must be suppressed.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, the Court now enters its:
ORDER
The stop that lead to the consensual search and seizure
was a pretext stop and an unconstitutional violation of the
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Defendant's right to be free from unreasonable searches
seizures under the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and Article I Section 14 of the Utah
Constitution.

All evidence procured as a result of the

unlawful stop of the Detendant is therefore suppressed,
DATED this
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DONALD J . EYHE,/JR7T
Juab County A t t o r n e y
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